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Abstract 
 
Additional opinions — dissenting opinions, separate opinions, declarations, and permutations thereof 
— are a familiar, if sometimes controversial, aspect of the international jurisprudential landscape. 
Given that the controversy provoked by additional opinions focuses on their perceived impact on the 
authority of judgments and decisions of international tribunals, and even the authority of the 
institutions themselves, additional opinions go to the heart of the manner in, and effectiveness by, 
which international tribunals discharge their functions. Yet, particularly in the context of international 
criminal justice, additional opinions have often been overlooked as a subject of critical engagement in 
their own right. Therefore, the purpose of this article is bring into focus the practice of judicial 
dissent, that is, the expression of strongly held and fundamental disagreement by judges through the 
vehicle of the additional opinion, and to stimulate a wider critical engagement with dissentient 
judicial practice. Rather than providing a review of the orthodox and doctrinal arguments in favour 
and against the publication of additional opinions, this article offers a reading of five prominent 
examples of judicial dissent in international criminal law and suggests how this practice could be 
conceived from the perspective of the functions that international criminal adjudication is expected to 
serve. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Deviance, difference, defiance, dissent. Often uttered in the same breath, each can evoke 
strong political and sociological connotations.
1
 Expressions of judicial disagreement in the 
form of dissenting and separate opinions, as well as declarations, are a familiar aspect of the 
international jurisprudential landscape. Yet, little focus has been directed specifically at the 
role played by judicial dissent in advancing the projects of international criminal justice and 
shaping the nature of the justice that the institutions of international criminal justice claim to 
pursue.
2
 At the same time, international criminal courts and tribunals have been responsible 
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for producing some of the most iconic instances of judicial dissent in international law. Justice 
Radhabinod Pal’s dissent at Tokyo,3 Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert’s Minority Opinion 
in Katanga before the International Criminal Court (ICC),
4
 the recent series of rhetorically 
and substantively powerful dissents emanating from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
5
 and Judge Hans-Peter Kaul’s multiple dissents at the ICC,6 
have all resonated beyond the relatively enclosed world inhabited by the community of 
international lawyers — judges, practitioners, and academics. 
On a narrow reading, it is possible to criticize dissentient practice because it 
undermines the perceived authority of the judgment with which it disagrees or even undercuts 
the standing of the institution responsible for that judgment.
7
 While these criticisms may be 
valid in their own right, such analysis is too restrictive. Focusing on so-called ‘fundamental 
dissents’, namely, those that express a ‘judge’s strong sentiment about a legal or factual 
issue’,8 this article will consider such dissents from a wider, functional perspective. It is 
suggested that the publication of fundamental dissents, particularly those explicitly 
challenging the lawfulness of the exercise of judicial power by a court, plays a constructive 
role in strengthening the legitimacy of those institutions and enhances their capacity to pursue 
the substantive aspiration of justice. This is the paradox of dissent.
9
 On the one hand, judicial 
dissent undermines and may even risk frustrating the legitimacy of international criminal 
courts and tribunals by prompting the various constituencies of international justice to 
question the correctness of their decisions and judgments. However, precisely by doing so, 
such dissents ultimately strengthen the legitimacy of those institutions and the aims that they 
seek to advance. 
Before exploring some examples of this paradox in operation, the following section 
will explain how it operates in principle, paying particular attention to the objectives pursued 
by international criminal courts and tribunals. It will focus on the need for accountability in 
the exercise of judicial power and inclusivity in the process of determining when that power is 
used. In doing so, this section will identify the role that judicial dissent — given the nature of 
judicial authority in the context of international criminal justice — is able to play in the 
attainment of these interests. 
 
2. Dissent and International Criminal Justice 
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It is not the objective of this article to provide a comprehensive account of orthodox debates 
on the desirability of permitting the publication of additional opinions.
10
 Rather, by offering 
one account of judicial dissent from the perspective of the advancement of projects of 
international criminal justice, this article intends to bring into focus the practice of dissent by 
international criminal judges, a practice often overlooked as a subject of critique in its own 
right, despite its prevalence. In doing so, it is hoped that this article will encourage a wider 
enquiry into how this practice affects the manner in which international criminal courts and 
tribunals discharge their functions. However, to establish the basis on which this article 
proceeds, it is necessary to briefly outline the contours of the existing debate and consider a 
handful of preliminary issues. 
Typical accounts of attitudes toward the publication of additional opinions in the 
context of international adjudication focus on the contrasting attitudes that are derived from 
domestic judicial traditions. Whereas the common law tradition has generally adopted a 
permissive attitude, civil law jurisdictions are taken to represent a more restrictive one.
11
 At 
the heart of this distinction lies the perceived impact the publication of additional opinions has 
on the authority of a court. Advocates claim that their publication strengthens the court’s 
authority, primarily through the transparency into the judicial procedure that additional 
opinions engender. However, critics of their publication assert that it risks undermining and 
frustrating that authority.
12
 These attitudes toward the publication of additional opinions are 
underpinned by certain assumptions regarding the nature of judicial authority.
13
 Although 
drawing on domestic law theory in the context of international law is perhaps an inevitable 
reality, care must be taken when determining what are appropriate transpositions in light of 
the characteristics of international justice and its institutions.
14
 Therefore, before transposing 
such assumptions fostered within the context of domestic legal systems to the international 
context, it is necessary to first determine the nature of judicial authority in the context of 
international criminal justice. It is only having done so that the appropriateness of such 
transpositions can be determined and the impact of the publication of dissent on that authority 
be assessed.
15
 
This article proceeds on the basis that international criminal justice does not share 
those characteristics of hierarchically organized models of judicial authority that demand the 
observance of a robust interpretation of the principle of secrecy (involving the suppression of 
additional opinions) in order to preserve that authority.
16
 Rather, international criminal justice, 
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like international law more widely, displays closer resemblance to the coordinate, or 
horizontal, ideal-type of authority, with official authority distributed widely, if unevenly.
17
 In 
this context, the mechanisms of oversight and accountability for the exercise of judicial 
authority lie beyond the institution or organization and in the hands of the body politic subject 
to its decisions.
18
 For example, the dependence of such judicial institutions on their own 
legitimacy as perceived by states, international organizations, and other actors in order to 
secure their political support, and technical cooperation and assistance to enable those judicial 
institutions to carry out their mandate,
19
 all stand in favour of the need for greater 
transparency in decision-making, rather than secrecy. 
Before explaining how transparency — in particular, that provided by the publication 
of dissent — operates to strengthen judicial authority, it is necessary to address one particular 
criticism of the principle underlying, and practice of permitting, the publication of additional 
opinions based on the specific characteristics displayed by criminal justice procedure. Doing 
so will demonstrate how attitudes in favour of a restrictive approach to the publication of 
additional opinions are underpinned by more fundamental concerns on the necessity for a 
robust application of the principle of secrecy. Understood as such, the suppression of minority 
views forms only one aspect of the implementation of the principle of secrecy, one which 
would be insufficient to obtain the objectives sought on its own. 
The criticism is that the publication of dissenting opinions — particularly those 
expressing disagreement on findings of fact — alongside judgments pronouncing verdicts of 
guilt found by a trial chamber beg the question whether the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
threshold of proof was, in fact, met by the chamber.
20
 In response, it may be submitted that 
the issue underlying this concern is not the publication of expressions of judicial 
disagreement, but rather the quorum of decision-making used by international criminal courts 
and tribunals to arrive at their verdicts. So long as judgments are determined on the basis of a 
majority vote — rather than requiring unanimity — knowledge of the fact that one third of the 
chamber disagreed with the verdict has the same outcome as that foreseen for the publication 
of dissent. Furthermore, even if the publication of the outcome of the vote was prohibited, 
knowledge of the possibility that the decision could have been rendered by a majority may 
give rise to suspicion. Moreover, the suppression of reasoned dissenting opinions deprives 
actors of the opportunity to determine whether the doubts expressed by the dissenting judge 
were reasonable or not, which may allow suspicion to fester. As such, the debate regarding 
the appropriateness of the publication of additional opinions must be considered in the wider 
procedural context within which they occur. 
Accordingly, this article proceeds on the observation that the norm of transparency in 
proceedings is a better ‘fit’ for international criminal justice in light of the structure of 
authority contained therein. From here, it suggests how the actual function of dissentient 
practice might be understood. Therefore, the focus will not be on the legality of judicial 
practice according to its conformity with the governing statutes of the respective courts and 
tribunals.
21
 Rather, this article will suggest how dissentient practice — irrespective of its 
legality — may strengthen the capacity of international criminal courts and tribunals to pursue 
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not only the objectives intended for them by those responsible for the institutions’ 
establishment, but also the broader societal goals that judicial proceedings are perceived to 
serve.
22
 Before taking this argument further, it is helpful to provide a brief review of the 
principal objectives attributed to international criminal justice. 
 
A. Objectives of International Criminal Justice: A Review 
 
International criminal justice is concerned with ensuring accountability for the perpetration of 
crimes under international law through the investigation and prosecution of individuals. 
International criminal justice, as one particular ‘justice-producing regime’,23 holds ambitions 
beyond the formal justice found in the enforcement of international criminal law in 
accordance with the rule of law. Individuals must be held accountable for crimes they commit 
in order to ‘do’ justice. Underlying this commitment to ‘doing justice’ is the liberal 
commitment to treat individuals as moral agents; punishment is deserved, and therefore ‘just’, 
when individual rational actors bear personal responsibility.
24
 Formal justice, namely, the 
adherence to the principles of legality and due process are essential characteristics that 
distinguish the law and legal process from competing forms of politics.
25
 Yet, international 
criminal justice, whether concerned with establishing the parameters of acceptable conduct 
(as discussed below) or the imposition of individual responsibility, is inherently concerned 
with normative questions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. 
 It is possible to identify two further objectives associated with the recourse to 
international criminal courts and tribunals in the pursuit of international criminal justice.
26
 
The retrospective orientation of the enforcement objective should be contrasted with the 
prospective orientation of another function of international criminal justice, that of norm 
projection and clarification. Here, the process of holding individuals accountable for 
violations of international criminal law is thought to contribute to the prevention of future 
violations of the law by emphasizing the parameters of lawful and legitimate conduct.
27
 
Although the effectiveness of the threat of prosecution and punishment as a deterrent to the 
commission of crimes by future actors can be questioned,
28
 the jurisprudence of international 
criminal courts and tribunals does clarify the law under which individuals, as rational actors, 
should conduct their affairs.  
Second, proceedings and judgments of international criminal courts and tribunals are 
often given a pedagogic function. Through the process of investigating a situation, the 
presentation of that evidence and the rigorous process of cross-examination and judicial 
analysis, the resulting judgment is often thought to contribute to the establishment of a 
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historical record of the violence in the context of which the crimes occurred.
29
 Again, while 
the appropriateness of the judicial forum to ‘write history’ has been called into doubt by both 
courts,
30
 and scholars,
31
 actors do look to the judicial process to give meaning to historical 
events.
32
 
B. Dissent, Legitimacy, and International Criminal Justice 
 
Recalling the coordinate structure of international criminal justice, wherein official authority 
— not only judicial authority, but legislative and enforcement authority — is distributed 
widely among a broad class of participants in the international legal system, the effectiveness 
by which international criminal tribunals can pursue these functions depends on the degree of 
legitimacy that they command. One account of legitimacy of international criminal courts and 
tribunals identifies four conceptions of legitimacy, all of which are required for those 
institutions to succeed in pursuing their objectives.
33
 Whereas ‘consent legitimacy’ concerns 
the degree of acceptance and approval of the institution; ‘purposive legitimacy’ involves the 
acceptance and approval of the ‘values, principles and goals’ that international criminal courts 
and tribunals operate to advance.
34
 Third, ‘universal values legitimacy’ provides that even 
when the values or interests advanced by international criminal courts and tribunals do not 
coincide with a specific sector of its constituency, such values are based on those of the whole 
community.
35
 Finally, ‘performance legitimacy’ focuses on issues including the transparency 
of decision-making and accountability of an institution to its founding authority and 
constituency.
36
 
The expressive potential of dissent can help to strengthen the claim of international 
criminal courts and tribunals to all four forms of legitimacy by engaging a wider range of 
actors on whose consent and values these bodies claim to be operating and by holding the 
exercise of judicial authority accountable to those actors. Given the accepted effectiveness of 
the criminal justice process in the pursuit of conceptions of social ordering,
37
 along with the 
high degree of semantic authority of international criminal courts and tribunals,
38
 
accountability for the exercise of such authority and power vested in the formal process of 
criminal adjudication is necessary to limit the risk of its abuse. This is achieved primarily 
through the operation of dissent as a mechanism of accountability through the transparency 
into internal deliberative processes. 
From the perspective of performance legitimacy, individual judges, through their 
dissents, open up the process of criminal adjudication to scrutiny and reveal latent interests or 
influences, to the extent these exist. In turn, this can (or should) prompt subsequent redress — 
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review of the judgment in appellate proceedings, correction of the law in subsequent cases, or 
where necessary, institutional reform. By ensuring and demonstrating that institutions and 
processes of international criminal justice are used independently, impartially, and fairly (the 
distinguishing characteristics of the judicial process),
39
 dissent can encourage greater 
acceptance of, and engagement with, these processes and institutions. In turn, this will 
strengthen claims to ‘consent legitimacy’ and enhance the effectiveness of the judicial process 
in ensuring accountability and projecting norms as well as validating and strengthening the 
project’s claims to universality. 
Rather than simply holding the exercise of judicial power accountable to only the 
‘legal community’, judicial dissent can hold it accountable to a wider range of audiences by 
making judicial reasoning accessible to lay audiences. The rhetorical force of the idea of 
dissent, with its powerful political and social capital, provides an opportunity. The attention 
attracted by the drama or spectacle associated with dissent provides international judges with 
a platform to engage directly with social and political actors in a way that may not be 
possible, even desirable, in the judgment handed down by the court. This way, judicial dissent 
constitutes a ‘portal by which the previously excluded can enter, engage with, and destabilize 
dominant (or majority) legal discourse’.40 
From the perspective of international criminal justice and the advancement of the 
legitimacy of international criminal courts and tribunals, such rhetorically powerful dissent is 
important for the following reasons. Judicial dissent can become a mechanism of ownership, 
making real the claim that the project represents a convergence of universal values and 
thereby enhance claims to ‘purposive’ and ‘universal values’ legitimacy. The adoption of 
procedural models at the ICTY to facilitate greater party participation has been justified in 
light of the degree of distrust held by defendants and their supporters against the institution.
41 
However, such distrust is not only held by the accused; it is also held by states — whether 
situation states or third states — whose cooperation and assistance is relied on for the 
functioning of the judicial process. Not only does the publication of dissent demonstrate the 
independence and impartiality (or indeed, suggest otherwise) of individual judges,
42
 but by 
providing an insight into the views of minority judges, dissent empowers minority defendants 
and other actors whom distrust the exercise of official authority by chambers of international 
criminal bodies.
43
 For example, utilizing the semantic authority of an individual judge, the 
dissenting opinion provides a platform for voicing a more diverse range of views on de lege 
ferenda, stimulating debates within the wider international lawmaking community whether 
those views should be acted on, while at the same time, constituting a source of arguments 
that may be pursued by litigants in appellate proceedings in the same case or subsequent 
cases. 
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More specifically, dissent reminds us to reflect on whether the law administered by 
international criminal courts and tribunals commands ‘purposive legitimacy’; does the law 
reflect the normative foundations of international criminal justice? For example, individual 
judges have used their right to dissent to open questions to the wider public regarding what 
justice means from the perspective of the individuals prosecuted by international criminal 
courts and tribunals. Recently, disagreement between judges has appeared most frequently — 
and often, most forcefully — in the context of ascertaining and applying the law regarding 
modes of liability. Judgments handed down by the ICTY and ICC demonstrate that 
international judges have been most divided when determining in what circumstances an 
individual is personally and criminally responsible for widespread acts of grave criminality 
which they may not have participated in directly or explicitly ordered.
44
 As the norm of 
international justice and accountability strengthens with the regularization of investigations 
and prosecutions of individuals for international crimes, these prominent dissents have played 
an important role in bringing to a wider audience fundamental debate on who should be held 
criminally responsible and on what basis.  
Finally, by opening up judicial reasoning and decision-making to a wider range of 
audiences — the importance of which has been recognized by international criminal courts 
and tribunals — 45 dissent contributes to the more effective dissemination and integration of 
norms of international justice. 
The following sections offer an interpretation of four instances of judicial dissent in 
order to suggest how dissentient practice has operated to strength the legitimacy of 
international criminal courts and tribunals, and thus, their ability to pursue the ambitions of 
international criminal justice. Whereas, it is more common to engage with the Nuremberg 
precedent, this article shall focus on the Tokyo precedent, and in particular, the precedent 
established by Justice Pal and his dissenting colleagues at the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal). It will examine the so-called ‘dissentient judgment’ of 
Justice Pal,
46
 before turning to recent jurisprudential developments at the ICC that witness 
judicial dissent being used to similar effect. 
 
3. Judicial Whistleblowing? 
 
A. Post Second World War Whistleblowing 
 
The Tokyo Tribunal occupies a conflicted position in the consciousness of advocates of 
international justice. On the one hand, along with its sister tribunal — the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, it forms a landmark in international criminal justice. Its 
judgment found all 25 Class ‘A’ defendants guilty of at least one count of crimes ranging 
from crimes against peace, war crimes to crimes against humanity, in respect of acts 
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committed between January 1928 and September 1945, during the course of Imperial 
Japanese expansionism and later the Pacific War. Yet, despite this cultivation of an image of 
the ‘biggest trial in history’,47 the Tokyo Tribunal has existed in relative obscurity, even 
among specialists in international criminal law.
48
 Along with well reported procedural 
defects,
49
 the main critique of the judgment centres on the idea of ‘victor’s justice’, the notion 
that the Allies turned to the judicial model in order to reinforce a particular post-conflict 
narrative of Japanese war guilt and Allied innocence.
50
 Exacerbated by charges of 
prosecutorial selectivity over which conduct and individuals were prosecuted,
51
 attitudes 
towards the Tokyo proceedings among even the most ardent supporters of international 
criminal justice have been, at best, ambivalent. 
The Tokyo proceedings stand as a prime example of what has been described as the 
‘legitimation function of war crimes trials’.52 Proceedings of international criminal courts and 
tribunals provide an official historical narrative ‘in which good and evil are clearly defined’, 
and in doing so, they ‘exculpate the culture which tries the criminal’.53 On the one hand, if the 
aim of the international criminal justice project is to determine the boundaries of legitimate 
conduct, then this function of proceedings appears a natural consequence by delegitimizing 
individuals infringing the law and legitimizing those acting to uphold it. The issue, however, 
lies in the question: in whose favour is the power of judicial decision-making deployed and in 
favour of which systems of power? Judicial dissent can operate as, what has been termed, a 
‘dissident narrative’. In other words, a ‘necessary antidote to the official version of the trial’, 
which can undermine the legitimation function of the trial process.
54
 On this basis, the right to 
dissent constitutes a powerful internal mechanism of accountability for the exercise of judicial 
power.
55
 The Tokyo proceedings held its own dissident narrative — the so-called dissenting 
‘judgment’ of Justice Pal.56 
Justice Pal’s 1,235 page dissenting judgment became the bible for critics of the 
‘victor’s justice’ embodied by the Tribunal’s majority judgment by reason of the 
comprehensive challenge it presented to its dominant narrative of Japanese war guilt and 
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Allied victimhood.
57
 Justice Pal’s conclusion — namely, the acquittal of all 25 defendants of 
all charges — was accompanied by a dense exposition of his legal and factual findings as well 
as questioning of the conduct of the Allies themselves.
58
 In sum, the judgment provided a 
fertile source of ammunition with which to repudiate the Tokyo Tribunal, an act that became 
synonymous for implying Imperial Japan’s innocence (or at least, that it was not any more 
guilty than other nations) for the breakdown of world order witnessed in the Second World 
War.
59
 Reaction to the judgment is without precedent. Families of those convicted by the 
Tokyo Tribunal conducted memorials in his honour on his death,
60
 and a shrine has been 
erected in his name.
61
 Even more remarkably, Justice Pal’s figure has featured as the ‘elegant 
and irreproachable hero’62 of a mainstream feature film.63 All this suggests the exceptional 
nature of Justice Pal’s dissent. To be sure, this level of celebrity should remain exceptional. 
While it is true that this infamy is largely the product of how his judgment was 
misappropriated and misrepresented by the nationalist movement,
64
 for the purposes of this 
article, Justice Pal’s judgment is instructive for two principal reasons. 
First, it reveals the power of the judicial process and judgment, and specifically, the 
power of the judicial dissent and its potential as an instrument of accountability. For some, the 
greatest contribution of Justice Pal to international criminal justice is found in his revelation 
of the effectiveness of the judicial process as an instrument to advance a particular political 
interest.
65
 It can only be speculated as to the Tribunal’s legacy had Justice Pal and his 
colleagues not dissented. After all, the Statute of the Tokyo Tribunal did not permit the 
publication of individual opinions. In practice, they became a reality once Justice Pal declared 
his intention to write an individual opinion.
66
 However, without the dissident narrative 
provided by Justice Pal and his dissenting colleagues,
67
 it can be asked whether today we 
would be less alert to the political dimension to proceedings of international criminal courts 
and tribunals, and therefore, less rigorous in our critique of them and those who deploy them. 
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Could the greatest contribution of Justice Pal’s judgment be found in its contribution to the 
institutional memory of the international judiciary and the legacy of the Tokyo Tribunal? 
Might the spectre of the individual opinions at Tokyo and the fierce demonstration of the 
individuality of the judges serve as a potent reminder of the power and potential of judicial 
dissent, a power that could be invoked should the circumstances require. 
Secondly, it has been suggested that the Tokyo trial and Justice Pal’s judgment have 
been at the forefront of shaping the Japanese ‘collective memory’ of Japanese conduct in the 
run up to, and during in the course of, the Second World War. Indeed, Justice Pal’s judgment 
and the counter-arguments it generated have provided the ‘basic conceptual framework for the 
study of World War II in Japan today’.68 To this effect, dissent that takes a fundamentally 
different interpretation of the evidence presented to the court may extend the social value of 
judicial intervention beyond its primary function of prosecuting egregious acts of violence. 
Such dissents may stimulate a discourse outside the courtroom that may be more conducive to 
the ends of historical truth seeking than courtroom processes.  
Contrast this position with those (including many who support the publication of 
additional opinions on questions of law) who today criticize the publication of dissent on 
findings of fact on the basis that the expression of factual disagreement undermines the 
acceptability of the decision on the part of the accused and their supporters.
69
 Finding 
expression in Article 83(4) of the ICC Statute, this distinction claims support from the 
restriction on the publication of minority views on determinations of fact within common law 
jurisdictions, which are typically accommodate expression of the plurality of views held by 
official decision-makers.
70
 While knowledge of the unanimity of judges in arriving at their 
decision may indeed strengthen the persuasive authority of that chamber’s decision or 
judgment,
71
 the desire for — and pursuit of — unanimity should not confused with the 
creation of a fiction of unanimity through the implementation of a principle of secrecy. As 
aptly demonstrated by the Tokyo proceedings, given the contentiousness of situations of 
political violence and mass atrocity concerning international criminal justice, the 
sustainability of a fiction of unanimity may be questioned as a matter of practice. It is unlikely 
that a judgment rendered by a court, irrespective of the strength of that reasoning, is going to 
persuade individuals, communities, and societies of the prevailing correctness of the facts as 
determined by the court, over their appreciation of the facts — appreciations that formed the 
basis of conflicts and atrocities. Rather, if views are influenced by determinations of fact by 
international criminal courts and tribunals, it will be by means of the package embodied by 
the judgment and its additional opinions, taken together.
72
 However, as reaction to the Tokyo 
jurisprudence demonstrates, the venue for that pursuit may not be the courtroom and the time 
for that discourse may be some time after the judicial proceedings have been completed. 
To summarize, irrespective of what one makes of his legal analysis and interpretation 
of the evidence, Justice Pal demonstrated the power of judicial dissent as a constraint on the 
effectiveness with which the judicial process and judgment can be deployed. Indeed, perhaps 
the greatest testament to this success may be found in contemporary orthodox critiques of 
self-proclaimed ‘fundamentally’ dissenting opinions.73 In contrast to those critiques, which 
view fundamental dissents as a threat, it is submitted that the potential for dissent as a 
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constraint is necessary, given both the actual and perceived risk of abuse of judicial power. 
Through his dissent, Justice Pal demonstrated the need for an effective mechanism to 
challenge or undermine the use of judicial power or to ‘blow the whistle’ on defects in 
procedure. Of course, the compromise was to open Justice Pal’s own actions and opinions up 
to the same critique as the judgment.
74
 Knowledge that such an internal ‘whistleblowing’ 
mechanism exists and has been used to demonstrable effect can strengthen the performance 
legitimacy of the wider process of international criminal adjudication. This assumes a certain 
degree of confidence in judges to exercise their right to dissent when the circumstances 
demand; it is after all, a right and not a duty. However, if that trust exists, the existence of 
dissents, such as Justice Pal’s, allow us to have greater confidence in the integrity of the 
decision-making process in the majority of cases, where such ‘fundamental dissents’ are 
absent. In sum, while Justice Pal’s dissent delivered a damaging blow to the credibility of that 
particular Tribunal and its judgment, it established a precedent — one that operates 
paradoxically to strengthen the performance legitimacy of the institutions of international 
criminal justice. 
 
B. 21st Century Judicial Whistleblowing 
 
More recently, the vehicle of dissent has been used to challenge the exercise of judicial power 
by judges before the ICC. The self-titled, Minority Opinion, of Judge Van den Wyngaert in 
the recent Katanga decision provides a clear example of how dissent can be forcefully 
employed to challenge how the Court uses its power and the impact of the use of that power 
on the observance of fundamental principles of justice.
75
 The case prompts the validity of 
fears that fundamental dissents on findings of fact undermine the acceptance of a verdict by 
the accused and other actors to be questioned. In 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the 
charges against Germain Katanga of seven counts of war crimes and three counts of crimes 
against humanity, on the basis of individual criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of 
the ICC Statute as co-perpetrator.
76
 These charges related to his alleged role in the 2003 attack 
against the village of Bogoro in the Ituri District of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
which occurred in the context of the armed conflict occurring between 2002 and 2004. Re-
characterizing the mode of liability for those charges from co-perpetration under Article 
25(3)(a) to the lesser mode of liability of accessory under Article 25(3)(d), the Trial Chamber 
proceeded to find Katanga guilty of one count of crimes against humanity and four counts of 
war crimes as an accessory, acquitting him of all other charges.
77
 
Principally, Judge Van den Wyngaert’s objection lay in the Trial Chamber’s re-
characterization of the charges, which she deemed an ultra vires exercise of judicial power 
vested in the judges by Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.
78
 Agreeing with the 
Chamber’s conclusion that the defendant was not guilty of the charges confirmed by the Pre-
Trial Chamber, and concluding that the decision of the Chamber to re-characterize the charges 
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was ‘invalid as a matter of law’,79 Judge Van den Wyngaert would have acquitted the 
defendant of all charges. The opinion continued to identify a potential litany of defects in the 
procedure and infringements of the fundamental rights of the accused as a result of this re-
characterization and the manner in which it was conducted.
80
 Judge Van den Wyngaert 
concluded that their cumulative effect was to present ‘a case of overwhelming strength against 
the legality and legitimacy of this judgment’.81 Moreover, even accepting in principle the 
power of the Trial Chamber to re-characterize the charges, her analysis of the facts led her to 
the conclusion that the re-characterized charges were not supported in fact, at least by those 
facts presented to the Chamber by the prosecution and accepted by the Pre-Trial Chamber as 
forming the basis of the confirmed charges.
82
 An archetypal example of a fundamentally 
dissenting opinion — Judge Van den Wyngaert made the depth of her disagreement with the 
Chamber’s decision clear in no uncertain term.83 This dissent prompted an equally robust 
response to some of her allegations by the two judges composing the majority. A joint 
Concurring Opinion in defence of the Chamber’s decision was handed down thereafter.84 
For the purposes of this article, the Katanga decision and accompanying opinions 
provide a rich contribution to analysis of the functions and effects of judicial dissent and the 
need for accountability for the exercise of judicial power to vindicate the ICC’s performance 
legitimacy. In particular, taken together, Judge Van den Wyngaert’s opinion and Judges 
Fatoumata Diarra’s and Bruno Cotte’s joint opinion, are a vivid demonstration of the 
accountability function of dissent in operation, with the force of the former compelling the 
latter. At the same time, the failure of the majority judges to respond in the judgment to the 
concerns expressed by Judge Van den Wyngaert, and by doing so, to strengthen the judgment 
against the challenge posed by the Minority Opinion was a missed opportunity. One of the 
traditional justifications for the publication of additional opinions is that the circulation of a 
draft dissenting opinion prior to the delivery of a judgment enables majority judges to 
improve the judgment by pre-empting criticisms contained in the dissent.
85
 That the Minority 
Opinion was responded to by a separate opinion rather than by a strengthened judgment may 
not stand in support of criticisms of the publication of additional opinions per se, but may be 
symptomatic of underlying issues (perhaps a breakdown in procedure, or collegiality) and in 
turn, their causes, that warrant remedial action. 
Had Katanga appealed his conviction by the Trial Chamber and relied on reasoning 
contained in the dissent, this situation would have been the paradigmatic example of how 
dissent is a mechanism by which the rights of the accused can be vindicated. However, the 
decision by the accused to withdraw from appellate proceedings and accept the findings of the 
Trial Chamber,
86
 notwithstanding the gravity of the concerns expressed in the dissent and the 
force with which they were expressed, gives rise to two questions. Interviews with the 
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accused’s defence counsel following the decision to withdraw appellate proceedings show 
that decision-making by parties to judicial proceedings is influenced by a range of interests 
and priorities, which may not coincide with those embodied in the ideals of justice as 
embodied through criminal adjudication.
87
 The decision to accept the verdict of the ICC may 
be influenced by the perceived correctness of the Court’s factual findings, but it is also 
affected by other factors, including the accused’s need for certainty and to obtain closure of 
proceedings.
88
 In this context, is fundamental dissent on questions of fact as threatening as 
those opposed to their publication suggest? 
In turn, if that anticipated threat is not realized, then this begs the question for 
advocates for the publication of dissent on questions of fact. If dissent on questions of fact 
does not prompt litigants to challenge the correctness of a Trial Chamber’s verdict through 
appellate proceedings, then how strong is the argument that it strengthens the ability of the 
process of justice as a whole to arrive at correct and just outcomes? Whether the result of 
appellant proceedings would have been to affirm the conviction and reject the merits of the 
complaints of the accused and concerns of Judge Van den Wyngaert, or whether the Appeals 
Chamber found merit in those complaints and acted on them, the outcome would have been to 
strengthen the integrity of the proceedings and conclusion as a whole by addressing those 
serious concerns. 
While it is the right of the accused not to avail himself of the right to appeal the 
conviction, the failure of the Appeals Chamber to authoritatively address the concerns 
expressed by Judge Van den Wyngaert risks the possibility that the conviction by the Trial 
Chamber will remain tainted by those allegations of impropriety. This latter point moves the 
issue beyond the immediate disputants and brings into focus the public authority exercised by 
international criminal judges and the wider societal functions of international criminal 
adjudication. Justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done — not only for the parties 
to the dispute, but also the wider constituencies with an interest in the proceedings.  
In response, it may be considered that from this wider perspective, while the 
dissenting opinion did not prompt further litigation in the same case, its publication may 
influence future cases where similar issues arise. The concerns expressed by the Minority 
Opinion may inform judicial practice in regards to the use of the impugned Regulation 55 
power to address those concerns in order to avoid a similarly critical dissent from within the 
Court. It might equally inform defence pleadings in a case where the accused is subject to the 
exercise of the Regulation 55 power by the Trial Chamber. Therefore, it would be too early to 
reject the utility of the Minority Opinion or assume that it vindicates critics’ concerns over 
permitting the publication of (fundamental) dissent. 
The Katanga decision and accompanying opinions are instructive for a further reason. 
Judge Van den Wyngaert’s analytical exposition of the evidence presented by the Court — as 
with Justice Pal’s dissent at Tokyo — offers an alternative narrative of the violence forming 
the heart of the charged crimes, but also the role of the accused in that narrative. At the core 
of the Minority Opinion is the inextricable link between the charges and factual narrative. As 
explained by Judge Van den Wyngaert, ‘charges allege the existence of specific relations 
between different facts and construct a particular narrative on this basis which, if true, would 
cover all the legal elements of the charges with which it corresponds’.89 Put differently, she 
continues, ‘it would, in theory, be possible to combine the individual pieces that are contained 
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in the narrative in many different ways’.90 Further, as was argued in the dissent, the judgment 
offers another alternative factual narrative to that presented by the prosecution.
91
 
Therefore, once again, the dissent stands as an explicit challenge to how a single 
judgment on the responsibility of a particular individual in regards to specifically charged 
crimes is viewed as contributing to the construction or consolidation of a wider historical or 
factual narrative. Indeed, recalling the legitimation function of war crimes trials referred to in 
the context of the Tokyo trial, Judge Van den Wyngaert expresses concern over how the Trial 
Chamber’s focus on one aspect of the case — ethnic animosity — not only oversimplifies the 
conflict and violence forming the subject matter of the case, but ‘grossly misrepresents reality, 
which is far more complex’, and further, ‘implicitly absolves others from responsibility’.92 
Judge Van den Wyngaert’s dissent supports the view that if the jurisprudence of international 
criminal courts and tribunals, as a whole, has a pedagogical utility, for individual opinions 
also suffer the same narrative limitations as the judgment or the case developed by the 
prosecution, then that utility lies in its contribution to pedagogical enterprises and analysis 
beyond the courtroom by different actors. Accordingly, in order for the potential that this 
jurisprudence holds to contribute to such processes to be realized, it is necessary that they are 
accessible and capable of being effectively disseminated among participants in those 
processes. 
Whereas the priority for the Allied authorities at Tokyo and the Tribunal’s Justices 
may not have been its legacy for a grander normative project of international criminal justice, 
and while the Katanga dissent begins to raise questions as to the implications of fundamental 
dissent on the conduct of future cases at the ICC, this precise question of legacy has become a 
highly contested issue as the ad hoc tribunals draw their two decades of activity to a close. 
The next section will consider how judicial dissent may be used to preserve the purposive 
legitimacy of the wider body of law through which international criminal justice is advanced. 
By undermining the authority of a particular judgment, or even institution, dissent can 
safeguard the wider interests of international criminal justice.  
 
4. An ‘Appeal to the Brooding Spirit of the Law’?
93
 
 
A recent spate of acquittals at the ICTY has brought the issue of dissentient practice to the 
forefront. This section will focus on the two dissenting opinions to the judgment of the 
Appeals Chamber in Gotovina and Markač.94 The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that the shelling of four Serbian towns in August 1995 during the course of 
‘Operation Storm’ by Croatian forces constituted indiscriminate attacks. This resulted in the 
acquittal of two Croatian commanders, four counts of crimes against humanity, and four 
counts of war crimes.
95
 The dissenting judges agreed with the majority that the Court had 
erred in law in its reliance on the so-called ‘200 metre standard of review’ in order to assess 
whether the impugned shelling was indiscriminate.
96
 However, unlike the majority, the 
dissenting judges did not consider this to be fatal to the finding of indiscriminate attacks on 
                                                 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Ibid., §§ 27-49. 
92
 Ibid., § 318. 
93
 C. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (Columbia University Press, 1936), at 68. 
94
 Judgment, Gotovina and Markač (IT-06-90-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2012. 
95
 Ibid. 
96
 Judge Pocar, § 10-11; Judge Agius, § 2. 
16 
 
the basis of the remaining evidence, and accordingly, would have confirmed the Trial 
Chamber’s conviction of both defendants on all charges.97 
Quite apart from the challenge that they present to the interpretation of law and 
evidence in the judgment, the fiery tone of the two dissenting opinions generated a stir within 
the legal fraternity. Describing the reasoning of the majority in places as ‘completely 
unjustified’,98 ‘grotesque’,99 and as ‘contradict[ing] any sense of justice’,100 the dissents 
forcefully impressed on readers the depth and degree of the disagreement between the judges 
hearing the appeal. For some, they provided a window to an unsavoury scene of defective 
process and reasoning lying at the heart of the judgment.
101
 For others, the use of 
‘inappropriate language’ by the judges risked ‘damag[ing] the very institution they 
represent’.102  
Views on the Appeals Chamber’s judgment were just as polarized beyond the 
courtroom. In Croatia, the reversal of the two convictions in Gotovina and Markač was 
widely seen as a victory for the nation as a whole. The acquittal of the only two Croats from 
Croatia to have been prosecuted by the ICTY has been widely seen as validating Croatia’s 
military activities during the course of the conflict, and in particular, Operation Storm.
103
 In 
Serbia, in contrast, the acquittal was met with outrage — whereas the judgment reinforced 
Croatian perceptions of victimhood during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia — for Serbs 
it reinforced subsequent Serbian victimhood by the ICTY and the wider international 
community backing it.
104
 Against this backdrop, and the strength with which attitudes toward 
the events during the conflict have firmly crystallized on all sides, there was little chance that 
the two dissenting opinions by Judges Pocar and Agius, however rhetorically powerful, could 
have tempered those views, at least in the present situation. Time will tell whether there is any 
scope for these dissents to facilitate debate once the conflict recedes further in the historical 
memory of the affected societies.  
Moving to the jurisprudential legacy, the depth of disagreement between the five 
eminent and highly experienced judges sitting on the Appeals Chamber gives reason to doubt 
whether the law in the concerned area is fit for purpose. If one of the fundamental 
justifications of the rule of law is to imbue certainty in transactions in order to protect 
legitimate expectations, then the law must be sufficiently certain to enable its subjects to 
identify the correct law and conduct their behaviour in accordance with the law. The question 
arises whether the dissenting judges, in order to imbue the law with certainty, should have 
suppressed or diluted their dissent to create stability, even at the expense of correctness of the 
law. In other words, should Judges Pocar and Agius have followed the dictum of Justice Louis 
Dembitz Brandeis, of the US Supreme Court, that ‘it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than it be settled right’.105 It is argued here that given the functions of 
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international criminal justice, the dissenting judges in Gotovina and Markač were correct not 
to have deferred correctness to the objective of stability. In order to do so, the following 
discussion will critique Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen’s declaration in another case before 
the ICTY, Orić, where an individual judge favoured stability at the expense of correctness.106 
In the Orić declaration, Judge Shahabuddeen explained why he had voted to uphold 
the validity of a point of law stated in the prior decision of the Appeals Chamber in 
Hadžihasanović and Kubura  — a Decision from which he had dissented.107 Given that the 
Chamber in Orić was evenly split over whether to uphold the prior decision on the disputed 
point of law,
108
 Judge Shahabuddeen’s vote was decisive. Concluding his declaration, he 
explained that a ‘decision to reverse [a decision] turns upon more than theoretical correctness: 
it turns upon larger principles concerning the maintenance of jurisprudence, judicial security 
and predictability’.109 The reasons why these considerations outweighed the reasons he 
accepted as grounds on which to overturn the prior decision — including the responsibility of 
the Appeals Chamber to state the correct law,
110
 and its power to correct law — 111 are not 
convincingly explained. Further, Judge Shahabuddeen agreed with the dissenting judges in the 
present case and his continued belief in his minority position in the prior decision.
112
 
Nevertheless, Judge Shahabuddeen favoured stability at the expense of correctness.  
However, from the perspective of the normative foundations of international criminal 
justice, this prioritization of stability at the cost of correcting what was widely considered 
among the judges of the ICTY to be an incorrectly decided point of law is difficult to accept. 
If the basis for punishment is individual responsibility for the conduct of rational actors, then 
to be just, the standards according to which that individual’s behaviour is judged must be 
correct. Both the principles of certainty and legality operate on the basis that to conduct their 
affairs in accordance with the law, rational actors need to know what that law is. But it is 
submitted that the principle of legality also requires individual behaviour to be judged 
according to the correct law. For a court to state that the law at a given time was X, and to 
judge an individual’s behaviour according to X, while knowing that the law at that time was 
actually Y, seems to defeat the objectives underpinning the principles of legality and 
certainty. While, on the facts of Orić, the disputed point of law was not decisive of the 
individual responsibility of the accused,
113
 from a systemic perspective this is problematic. As 
Judge Shahabuddeen observed,
114
 practice suggests that trial chambers of the ICTY are bound 
to follow the law as stated by the Appeals Chamber.
115
 Therefore, the consequence of his 
decision to uphold the decision in Hadžihasanović on the disputed point was to bind trial 
chambers to knowingly apply what was more widely considered to be incorrect law.
116
 
More widely, even though international criminal courts and tribunals do not formally 
possess legislative power, the combined effect of the principles of legality and certainty 
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demand that courts must correctly represent the law. Given the semantic authority of courts 
and tribunals,
117
 rational actors are likely to rely on their pronouncements in order to identify 
the law according to which they should conduct their behaviour. Therefore, not only should 
there be a duty on courts to state the correct law, but there should be a duty (rather than 
simply a power) to correct their statements of the law. Building on observations regarding the 
contribution of individual opinions at the ad hoc tribunals to the development of an 
operational body of substantive and procedural international criminal law,
118
 the paradox of 
dissent, it is argued, operates by ensuring that courts fulfil their duties in respect of the correct 
law, thereby advancing the interests of justice. 
Dissents such as those of Judges Pocar and Agius bring to light the limitations of the 
legislative power of international criminal courts and tribunals. By creating uncertainty 
regarding the correctness of statements of the law within a decision of a court, such dissents 
encourage actors to seek out with certainty whether in fact the decision is a correct reflection 
of the law. If it is not correct, then actors know not to conduct their behaviour according to it, 
but if it is, then they can do so with greater confidence. Even when it is concluded that the law 
articulated by the majority is accurate, dissents, such as those of Judges Pocar and Agius, are 
appeals ‘to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day’ in order to 
change or reform the law.
119
 Judicial dissent does not merely give representation to the 
plurality of understanding of those laws, values, and interests that are held by the diversity of 
actors subject to a universal project of international justice. Rather, the real potential lies in 
the ability of judicial dissent to contribute to the process of making the project’s professed 
universality real. Judicial dissent within international criminal courts and tribunals forms a 
platform on which a more diverse range of actors are engaged and empowered in the process 
of evaluating the weight and contribution of a judgment to the identification of international 
criminal law. 
Accordingly, while the dissents could be appeals to future courts — whether chambers 
of the ICC or national or hybrid courts — they could equally be appeals to other participants 
in the process of international lawmaking and law interpretation. Returning to the dispute in 
Gotovina and Markač, by highlighting the unsatisfactory nature of the application of 
international criminal law to military decisions relating to matters such as targeting, the 
judgment and its dissenting opinions have defined the parameters within which the legal and 
policy debates necessary to clarify this disputed area of law are being conducted.
120
 
So far, this article has demonstrated how judicial dissent may be used to constrain the 
exercise of institutional and semantic authority held by international criminal courts and 
tribunals. However, the following section argues that judicial dissent may also be a 
mechanism to hold to account the exercise of prosecutorial power in deciding when the 
judicial process, and the power it entails, is deployed.  
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5.  ‘Judge Gave Hope to Ocampo Four But Chamber Dissented’121 
 
The ten year anniversary of the entry into force of the ICC Statute provided an opportune 
moment for collective reflection on the past, the present, and the future of international 
criminal justice.
122
 The ad hoc tribunals are drawing their activities to a close and the ICC is 
established and operational, its Statute ratified by 122 states. Yet, despite the many triumphs 
for international criminal justice over the past two decades, there is an overwhelming 
dispirited mood, a loss of momentum, and a sense of uncertainty over where it is going and 
where it should be going.
123
 This section will examine an instance of judicial dissent at the 
ICC, which may prompt consideration of what role judicial dissent can, and should, play in 
the course of these deliberations. 
In 2009, the prosecutor of the ICC requested authorization to open an investigation 
into the situation in Kenya, in light of evidence he had obtained suggesting that crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction may have been committed during the violence that followed Kenya’s 
national elections in December 2007.
124
 The request outlined the prosecutor’s intention to 
investigate allegations that acts, including murder, sexual violence, and deportation, 
constituting crimes against humanity had been committed.
125
 For a period during the pre-trial 
phase of the investigations by the ICC, one judge — Judge Hans-Peter Kaul — became a 
focal point for media attention within Kenya.
126
 The reason behind this attention was his 
dissentient views, repeated in each decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber.
127
 The basic premise of 
his disagreement lay in his view that the ICC lacked material jurisdiction over the violence, 
by reason of its failure to satisfy the necessary requirements for it to fall within the definition 
of crimes against humanity, under Article 7 of the ICC Statute.
128
 By reason of the popular 
interest generated by this dissenter, Judge Kaul’s fundamental message — that while the post-
election violence was criminally proscribed conduct, it did not fall within the jurisdiction of 
ICC — 129 was repeated consistently and constantly. Consider the fundamental ambition 
shared by projects of international justice, namely, to delegitimize the politics of violence.
130
 
The regular reiteration of Judge Kaul’s viewpoint by the media coverage of each of his 
dissents emphasized within mainstream political discourse the idea that irrespective whether 
one was ‘for’ or ‘against’ the ICC’s intervention, the violence committed was not lawful or 
legitimate. 
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From the perspective of the project of international criminal justice, Judge Kaul’s 
dissents are intriguing on another level. Before elaborating a detailed explanation of the legal 
basis of his opinion, he took a moment to explicitly justify it on a policy basis, which he 
identified as being the ‘interest of criminal justice in general and international criminal justice 
in particular’.131 Judge Kaul explicitly addressed how such ICC interventions into some 
situations may actually hinder the pursuit of the wider objectives of international criminal 
justice by undermining the ability of the ICC to conduct its activities effectively and 
efficiently. He explained that the ‘gradual downscaling of crimes against humanity towards 
serious crimes’ risked infringing on state sovereignty and opening the ambit of the Court’s 
jurisdiction indefinitely. In turn, he argued that in light of the Court’s reliance on state 
cooperation and its limited financial and material resources and capacity, stretching the 
Court’s capacity further while, at the same time, antagonizing the very states on which it 
relies for cooperation would undermine the Court’s ‘standing and credibility’. Crucially, the 
result of this, he concluded, might be to deprive victims of any access to justice, due to the 
inability of the Court to conduct investigations into situations.
132
 
The legal basis for his opinion — that the ICC lacks jurisdiction over the situation —
served to undermine the substantive authority of the Court despite the majority having 
determined that the Court held competence. Might dissents during this phase of proceedings 
affect cooperation with the Court by affected individuals and states in subsequent stages of 
proceedings (recall Judge Kaul’s observations regarding the ICC’s reliance on state 
cooperation)? 
Yet, once more, it is possible to identify the paradox of dissent in operation. Indeed, 
Judge Kaul explicitly claimed to be using his right to dissent in order to advance international 
criminal justice.
133
 At the outset of this section, it was observed that international criminal 
justice is suffering from a loss of confidence. It appears to be struggling to defend its 
legitimacy against allegations of selectivity and institutional bias, typically against African 
states and their governing officials, while at the same time, failing to ensure accountability for 
violations of international criminal law when those accused are officials of powerful states 
and their allies.
134
 Belying these tensions are concerns that international criminal justice and 
its institutions, as they operate today, are not giving effect to the values and interests of a 
considerable section of its constituency, thus calling into question their purposive 
legitimacy.
135
 In practical terms, as Judge Kaul explained, this affects state cooperation 
(implying an impact on its consent legitimacy) and the efficacy with which the ICC can 
pursue its accountability objectives. 
As has been discussed throughout this article, the dissenting opinion holds potential to 
be a visible and powerful platform from which to be heard. The publication of dissent 
demonstrates that there are voices within the institution that share the views and concerns held 
within significant sections of the constituencies of international criminal justice. Contrast the 
potential audience of a dissenting opinion (particularly those concerning highly contentious 
cases attracting considerable public interest) with the audiences that a judge might expect 
when writing or speaking extra-judicially, for example, at a conference or in an academic 
journal. Therefore, as in the case of fundamental dissents on matters of law, could judicial 
dissent on matters of policy of international criminal justice help to instigate and inform 
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debates among those actors more responsible for decisions on such matters? Should judicial 
dissent be used to such effect? 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the United States there exists a political magazine entitled Dissent.
136
 Recently its ethos has 
been described as ‘a spirit of criticism, a vision of a more just society, an openness to 
movements of democratic change, a refusal to accept the given on its own terms’.137 It is 
further explained how the founder of the magazine envisaged this ethos as one of a modest 
and humane utopia — ‘a yearning for what is not but may be’.138 On this view of dissent, 
perhaps it could be said that the project of international criminal justice  — with all the grand 
objectives attributed to it  — is steeped in the ethos of dissent. 
Yet, dissenting judges occupy a peculiar position in the process of international justice 
— at once they stand inside and outside the authority of the court.139 Despite their personal 
disagreement, their contribution to the composition of the chamber as well as their 
participation in proceedings are constitutive of the formal authority vested in the judgment. 
By signing the judgment, the dissenting judge accepts both that authority and their own 
responsibility for that judgment as a member of the chamber.
140
 But, at the same time, their 
dissent — a product of their voting against one or more of the dispositive paragraphs of the 
judgment — signals their simultaneous dissociation from that same judgment. It has been 
argued that, from this position (perhaps in itself, a paradox), dissenting judges serve a critical 
function in holding to account the exercise of power, judicial (Justice Pal, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert and Judges Pocar and Agius) and prosecutorial (Judge Kaul). 
Looking forward, what does this mean for analysis of dissentient practice? While it 
may correctly be observed that certain instances of judicial dissent risk undermining the 
authority of international criminal courts and tribunals and their pronouncements, we should 
be cautious not to end our analysis there. The very act of, or potential to, undermine 
institutional authority — and in doing so constrain the exercise of judicial power and its 
consequences — may serve to strengthen the legitimacy of those same institutions. By 
strengthening acceptance of those institutions within the constituencies that they serve, in the 
long term, this paradox of dissent can aid the pursuit of the ambitions of international criminal 
justice. 
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